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Case No. 16829 
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the Appellants against the 
Respondents in which the Appellants seek specific performance 
or in the alternative for damages for the alleged breach of 
a real estate Earnest Money Agreement. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Respondents 
on the ground that the Appellants failed to obtain financing 
for the purchase within a reasonable time as required by the 
Earnest Money Agreement. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondents seek to have the judgment of the trial 
court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In February of 1978, the Appellants, Kenneth and Tammy 
Bradford made an offer to purchase a home from the Respondents, 
Michael and Vaughn Alvey, d/b/a C. Howard Alvey & Sons (R. 371). 
The home was under construction on Lot 95 of the Shiloh sub-
division located in Salt Lake County. (R. 371, Exhibit 1) Michael 
Herzog, a real estate agent employed by Mid-Valley Investment, 
a corporation, acted as the Appellants' agent in preparing 
an Earnest Money Receipt and Of fer to Purchase Agreement on 
the home. (R. 372, 397, 443) The Appellants inserted in the 
Earnest Money Agreement a condition which read, "Subject to 
Buyer obtaining financing (FHA)." (R. 373, 3'97) The Respondents, 
Alvey accepted Bradfords' offer as it was presented by Herzog. 
(Exhibit 1) • 
-2-
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Appellants were familiar with the clause "Subject to Buyer 
obtaining financing", having inserted the same clause in one 
of their two prior purchases of real property. (R. 410-11) 
Appellants concurred with their real estate agent that it was 
in their interest to insert the subject to financing clause. 
(R. 397) Appellants purpose in inserting the clause was to 
enable them to avoid all obligations under the Earnest Money 
Agreement unless or until they obtained a loan committment. 
(R. 375, 406) 
A few days after the Earnest Money Agreement was submitted 
and accepted by the Respondents Alvey, Appellants' real estate 
agent make an appointment for them to commence the loan appli-
cation process at American Home Mortgage. (R. 375) During 
this meeting the Appellants discussed the qualifications for 
a home loan but did not make application for a loan. (R. 375) 
Appellants knew that prequalif ication was different from obtaining 
a committment on a loan and that after the initial meeting 
at American Home Mortgage, Appellants were aware that they 
had not obtained a loan committment. (R. 419) Despite their 
obligation to obtain financing, the Appellants made no effort 
to do so and in the Fall of 1978, the Appellants purchased 
another home in Salt Lake County. (R. 407-08) Subsequently, 
the Appellants sold that home and made inquiry of the construction 
foreman when the home subject to the Earnest Money Agreement 
would be completed, but still the Appellants made no effort 
-3-
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to procure financing for the home (R. 419, 441, 386, 389, 
397) • 
In March of 1979, the Respondent Micro Investment, through 
its General Partner, Michael E. Crowley, gave an Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase to the Respondents Alvey, covering 
the entire Shiloh subdivision, including the home contracted 
on Lot 95. (Ex. 11) The Micro Investment Earnest Money Agreement 
indicated that the home on Lot 95 was "pre-sold". (R. 452) 
The term "pre-sold" was not intended by the Respondents 
Alvey to express any opinion as to the validity of the Appellants' 
Earnest Money Agreement, only that an Earnest Money Receipt 
had been received. (R. 457) In fact, Respondents Alvey had 
stated to the Respondents Crowley that the Appellants' Earnest 
Money Agreement would probably not be an obligation of Respondent 
Micro Investment because Respondent Alvey had been informed 
that the Appellants did not want to go forward with the sale. 
(R. 452) The only reason the Earnest Money Agreement was listed 
by the Respondents Alvey was to make a full and complete dis-
closure to the Respondent.Micro Investment of the history of 
the subdivision. (R. 457-58) The term "pre-sold" was understood 
by the Respondent Crowley to mean only that.Micro Investment 
would pay the seller's portion of any real estate conunission 
on sales of homes already subject to valid Earnest Money Agree-
ments. (R. 508-09) 
-4-
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The Appellants contacted the Respondent Crowley during 
the month of April 1979, regarding the Earnest Money Agreement. 
(R. 394) During the conversation, Respondent Crowley indicated 
that he would not honor the Earnest Money Agreement because 
the Appellants had made no effort to secure a loan committment 
during the preceeding thirteen months. (R. 509) Thereafter, 
the Appellants commenced this law suit, still having never 
procured a loan conunittment. (R. 419) 
ARGUMENT 
In this appeal, the Appellants alleged three errors of 
the trial court. The first error alleged is that the trial 
court erred in finding that the Appellants failed to obtain 
financing as required by the Earnest Money Agreement within 
a reasonable time. The Respondents' reply to this allegation 
is addressed in Point I. 
Second, the appellants allege that the trial court erred 
in sustaining respondents' objection on the ground of hearsay 
to the Appellants' attempts to testify as to statements made 
by a real estate agent. Respondents address this alleged error 
in Point II. 
Finally, error is alleged in the trial court's refusal 
to permit Appellants to amend their complaint after trial pursuant 
to U.R.C.P. lS(b). This issue is addressed in Point III. 
-5-
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POINT I 
THE RECORD ON APPEAL DOES NOT CLEARLY PRE-
PONDERATE AGAINST THE FINDING THAT THE 
APPELLANTS FAILED TO USE REASONABLE DILI-
GENCE TO OBTAIN FINANCING AND THEREFORE 
THE TRIAL COURT RULING MUST BE AFFIRMED 
The trial court properly ruled that where an Earnest Money 
Agreement provides that payment of the balance of the purchase 
price is conditioned upon the securement of a loan, an implied 
condition precedent is ~mposed on the buyer to use reasonable 
diligence to procure the loan. Anaheim Company v. Holcombe, 
246 Or. 541, 426 P.2d 743 (1967); Lach v. Cahill, 85 A.2d 480, 
482 (Conn. 1951); Annot., 81 ALR 2d 1338 (1962) • If the condition 
precedent is not performed within the time granted by the agreement, 
then there is no binding obligation on either party. Baker v. 
Fell, 144 s.w. 2d 255, 257 (Texas App. 1940); Mecham v. Nelson, 
551 P. 2d 529, 533 (Idaho 1969); Highland Plaza, Inc. v. Viking 
Investment Corp., 2 Wash. App. 192, 467 P.2d 378, 383 (1970). 
Because the Earnest Money Agreement in this case did not state 
when the Appellants had to obtain financing, the trial court 
ruled that the Appellants had to obtain financing within a 
reasonable time. 
In commercial Security Bank v. Johnson, 173 P.2d 277, 
281 (Utah 1946), this Court defined reasonable time as, "So 
much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do 
conveniently what the contract or duty required should be done 
in a particular case." 
Additionally, when the remedy of specific performance 
is sought, the court must find that the party requesting such 
-6-
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remedy has fully and fairly performed all of the conditions 
which he has agreed to peform under the contract. Larson v. 
Larson, 129 N.W. 2d 566, 567 (N.D. 1964). As this court stated 
in Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P. 2d 45·, 46 (Utah 1974) : 
Specific performance is a remedy of equity; 
and one who invokes it must have clean 
hands in having done equity himself. That 
is he must take care to discharge his own 
duties under the contract; and he cannot 
rely on any mere inconvenience as an excuse 
for his failure to do· so. Even if inconvenience 
or difficulty is encountered, he must make 
an effort to perform, or to tender performance, 
which manifests reasonable diligence and 
bona fides his desire to keep his own promises. 
After having heard and considered the evidence produced at 
trial, the trial court held that the Appellants failed to use 
reasonable diligence to obtain a financing agreement. 
The Appellants commence their argument against the trial 
court ruling by correctly stating that the request for specific 
performance of the agreement creates an equitable action which 
permits this Court to review both the law and the facts of 
the case. However, Appellants fail to set forth the relevant 
standard of review established by this court. In Timpanogas 
Highland, Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481, 483 (Utah 1975), this 
Court in reviewing a trial court's refusal to give specific 
performance of an Earnest Money Agreement stated: 
Even though we may review the facts, 
the well established and long followed 
rule, is that due to the prerogative of 
the trial court as the initial trier of 
the facts, and his advantaged position 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses 
-7-
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and the evidence presented, we indulge 
the trial court with considerable latitude 
in those matters. Therefore, we do not 
review in the manner plaintiff suggests: 
To determine whether we would agree that 
the 'evidence fairly preponderates in favor 
of the findings.' But due to the tolerance 
indulged as just stated, we do not reverse 
unless we are persuaded that the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the findings. 
Therefore, in order for the Appellants to prevail on appeal, 
this Court must find that the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the Lower Court's finding that the Appellants failed 
to use reasonable diligence to do what the contract required 
them to do. The record of the proceedings below, however, 
provides firm support for the trial court's ruling. 
Initially, the importance of the subject to financing 
clause to the Appellants, as buyers, and to the Respondents, 
as sellers, must be understood. The Appellants in this case 
were sophisticated buyers. From previous experience they knew 
that the subject to financing condition would give them a way 
out of the Agreement in the event that they decided not to 
go forward with the purchase. (R. 375, 406) And in their prior 
experience they took immediate steps to satisfy the financing 
condition precedent. (R. 411) 
It is also important to understand that the Respondents 
as building contractors must have the financing condition satisfied 
as soon as possible. First, a builder, such as the Respondents 
Alvey, is restricted by a lender as to the number of speculation 
homes, those commenced without an identified buyer, which 
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may be under construction at one time. (R. 472) Once an offer 
is received on a speculation house, such as the house on Lot 
95, and the buyer obtains a committment for financing, then 
the lender no longer considers the house as a speculation house 
for purposes of determining whether or not the builder is entitled 
to cormnence another house on a speculation basis. (R. 472-
73) 
Second, a builder must be assured that the buyer has the 
financial resources to complete the purchase before the builder 
makes improvements suited to the particular taste of the Buyer 
which would affect the marketability of the house in the event 
the buyer declines to complete the purchase. (R. 474) 
Third, once an offer is received on a house, the house 
is taken off the real estate market listing bo~rd and if the 
buyer fails to take immediate steps to obtain financing and 
is later unable to obtain financing then the builder is deprived 
of valuable time and exposure necessary to market the property. 
(R. 491) For these reasons it was the general practice of 
the Respondents Alvey to either require the buyer to make the 
of fer subject to financing which would thereby require the 
buyers to obtain proof of their ability to complete the trans-
action or the Respondents Alvey would insert a 72 hour clause 
which stated that if a second offer were received by the Respondent 
on the home, then the first buyers would have 72 hours to tender 
payment for the home or the second off er could be accepted 
by the builder. (R. 474) Here the 72 hour clause was not 
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inserted by Respondents Alvey because the offer was subject 
to Appellants obtaining financing. 
The house on Lot 95 was in the early stage of construction 
when the Appellants entered the Earnest Money Agreement. (R. 
488) Within a couple of days after the Agreement had been 
accepted, the Appellants' real estate agent took them to American 
Home Mortgage for the purpose of commencing the procedure to 
obtain financing. (R. 375) A buyer is considered to have 
obtained financing when he obtains a letter of committment 
from the lender. (R. 488-89) After the application procedure 
is completed and the loan has been approved by the lender, 
the lender will send a letter to the builder informing the 
builder that the buyers have qualified for a loan committment 
of a particular sum, at a particular interest rate and that 
the committment will be binding upon the lender for a stated 
time. (R. 488) Upon receipt of this letter the buyers have 
satisfied the condition precedent and their offer to purchase 
is no longer subject to obtaining financing. (R. 489) 
At the conclusion of the meeting at American Home Mortgage, 
the Appellants were instructed by their·real estate agent to 
continue to pursue the loan. (R. 414) However, rather than 
follow the agent's advice, the Appellants did not bother to 
even commence the process by making an application for a loan. 
(R. 419) 
An FHA loan committment can only be obtained after qualificatic 
of both the property and the buyer. (R. 515) Qualification 
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of a house which is in the early stages of construction, as 
was the home on Lot 95, is done by appraisal from a set of 
plans and specifications. (R. 513) If the home is approved 
• by FHA from the plans and specifications then FHA will issue 
a conditional committment on the property subject only to the 
home being completed according to the plans and specifications. 
(R. 362) While the property is being qualified by FHA, the 
mortgage lender prepares a package establishing the qualification 
of the Buyers, for example, verification of employment, income 
and debts. (R. 513) Upon receipt of the conditional conunittrnent, 
the lender will then submit the buyer qualification package 
and request from FHA a firm committment. (R. 363) When both 
the house and buyer have been approved by FHA, a letter of 
firm committment is issued which is binding for a period of 
six months. (R. 515) 
The president of American Home Mortgage, where the Appellants 
initially inquired. about financing, and the Appellants' expert 
witness from Mason-McDuffy, where a conventional loan was 
eventually obtained in July of 1979, both testified that FHA 
financing could have been obtained at the time the Appellants 
first went to American Home Mortgage. (R. 515) According 
to the testimony at trial, a final committment from FHA is 
usually received within at least 13 working days from the request 
for the committment. (R. 364) At its longest, the entire 
procedure for obtaining an FHA loan committment does not extend 
beyond 90 days. (R. 362-63, 515) 
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The uncontradicted testimony at trial was that if the 
Appellants had obtained a loan conunittment, the Respondents 
Alvey could have completed the house on Lot 95 within a month 
and a half from the date of receipt of the conunittment. 
(R. 482, .501)' 
The Appellants took the position that they did not have 
to obtain financing until construction of the home was completed. 
(R. 403) However, the Appellants also maintained· that they 
always intended to reiy on the financing condition as a means 
to avoid obligation under the contract. (R. 422) 
The Appellants cite in support of t~e reasonableness of 
their conduct, the several conversations between Appellants 
and the secretary and construction foreman of the Respondents 
Alvey. However, Appellants. never discussed their obligations 
under the Earnest Money Agreement but only the obligations 
which would arise on the part of the Respondents after receipt 
of the loan conunittment. (App. Brie·f at 11-13) The Appellants 
also admitted that neither of the Respondents Alvey instructed 
the Appellants to deal in any manner with the secretary or 
construction foreman as to either the construction or the sale 
of the house. (R. 415, 448) 
Further, the Appellants never attempted to deal directly 
with either of the Respondents Alvey regarding any matter of 
financing or construction on the home. (R. 404) 
The record also contains numerous references to what is 
considered to be a reasonable time necessary to procure a 
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loan in the housing industry. The Respondents Alvey, as builders 
testified that a reasonable time to obtain financing was thirty 
to sixty days. (R. 482) Appellants' expert witness, a mortgage 
banker, testified that it takes as much as thirteen working 
days to get a firm committment from FHA. (R. 363-64) The 
President of American Home Mortgage testified that the normal 
length of time it takes to obtain a committment from FHA is 
sixty days, at the outside, ninety days. (R. 517) Respondent 
Crowley, as a developer, testified that a reasonable time to 
obtain financing is ninety days at the outside. (R. 525) Lynn 
Marsing, as a real estate broker, testified that at the out-
side an FHA committment can be obtained within ninety days. 
(R. 52!) Mr. Marsing stated that the industry intent and purpose 
of the subject to financing clause was to release all parties 
to an Earnest Money Agreement if the condition to obtain 
financing was not met or failed to materialize within a reason-
able time. (R. 520). 
Finally, and most important, the Appellants simply failed 
to take any steps to procure a loan committment until several 
months after this action was commenced. (R. 445 I 419' 345-46) 
POINT II 
AS PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT, THE STATEMENTS 
OF MICHAEL HERZOG WERE HEARSAY EVIDENCE 
NOT WITHIN ANY EXCEPTIONS TO UTAH RULES 
OF EVIDENCE NO. 63 AND THEREFORE WERE PROPERLY 
EXCLUDED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
-13-
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Michael Herzog was a licensed real estate agent employed 
by Mid-Valley Investment, a corporation. (R. 372) The Respond-
ents Michael Alvey and Vaughn Alvey were general partners doing 
business as C. Howard Alvey & Sons, a general construction 
company. (R. 450) Michael Herzog was requested by the Appellants 
to act as their agent in presenting an off er for the purchase 
of property from the Respondents Alvey, d/b/a c. Howard Alvey 
& Sons. (R. 443) 
The Appellants did not obtain the attendance of Mr. Herzog 
at the trial, for reasons which were not disclosed in the record. 
Rather, the Appellants attempted to testify as to their conversatiorn 
with Michael Herzog and later an affidavit was prepared for 
Mr. Herzog which was submitted to the court after trial.. (R. 194-96) 
The Appellants' efforts to testify as to statements made 
by Michael Herzog were objected to by the Respondents on the 
ground of hearsay. The Appellants established no connection 
between Mid-Valley Investment, a corporation, and C. Howard 
Alvey & Sons, a general partnership, other than at one time, 
Michael Alvey was an acting vice president and treasurer of 
the corporation and Vaughn Alvey was the acting president and 
secretary of the corporation. (R. 450) There was no evidence 
that at the time Mr. Herzog made any statements to the Appellants 
that the Respondents Alvey held any off ice in the corporation 
of Mid-Valley Investment. Nor was there any evidence of the 
scope of Mr. Herzog's employment with or his authority to 
-14-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
speak for Mid-Valley Investment or C. Howard Alvey & Sons. 
Further, there was no evidence of any connection between Mid-
Valley Investment Corporation and C. Howard Alvey & Sons, a 
general partnership. The evidence did establish, however, 
that c. Howard Alvey & Sons was a building construction company 
and was not a real estate marketing company. (R. 485) Based 
upon the total absence of evidence of an agency relationship 
between Michael Herzog, an employee of Mid-Valley Investment 
Corporation and C. Howard Alvey & Sons, a partnership, the 
trial court excluded the statements on the grounds of hear-
say. (R. 373-74) 
On appeal, the Appellants argue that the statements of 
Michael Herzog were admissible under the Authorized and Adoptive 
Admissions exception to the hearsay rule, or the Vicarious 
Admissions exc·eption to the hearsay rule. However, Appellants 
failed to establish the availability of either exception at 
trial. 
In order for the statements of Michael Herzog to be admissibl 
against the Respondents under Rule 63(8) (a), the Appellants 
were required to show that Mr. Herzog was authorized by C. 
Howard Alvey & Sons to make a statement for it concerning the 
subject matter of the statement. No evidence of such authorizatio 
was submitted at trial and the Appellants cited none in their 
brief. However, the Appellants assert that authorization can 
be gleened first from the fact that all negotiations regarding 
the sale took place between Bradfords and Herzog and second, 
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that the defendant, Michael Alvey instructed Michael Herzog 
to assist the Appellants in obtaining financing. 
The first assertion that all negotiations regarding the 
sale of property took place between Herzog and the Bradf ords 
is not born out by the record. The Appellants contacted Herzog· 
regarding the purchase of the property. Herzog, acting as 
the agent for the Appellants, prepared the offer with those 
terms and conditions he felt benefited the Appellants. (R. 
373) Herzog then presented the offer to the Respondents Alvey 
who accepted the conditional offer to purchase and Herzog 
communicated acceptance of the offer to the Appellants. The 
Respondents produced no evidence either during or after the 
trial to the effect that Michael Herzog acted as the representative 
of c. Howard Alvey & Sons. Under these circumstances it has 
been recognized that the real estate agent is acting as the 
agent of the purchaser. Duffy v. Setchell, 38 Ill. App. 3d 
146, 347 N.E. 2d 218, 221 (1976); Baskin v. Dam, 4 Conn. Cir. 
702, 239 A.2d 549, 552 (1967). 
The second contention, that the Respondents Alvey instructed 
Michael Herzog to assist the Appellants in obtaining financing, 
does not provide support for the contention that Herzog acted 
as the agent of C. Howard Alvey & Sons. The Appellants correctly 
point out that Respondents Alvey instructed the Bradfords to 
obtain financing indirectly through Michael Herzog. (Appellants' 
Brief at 18-19) However, the Appellants' brief fails to continue 
quoting from the record, although the testimony addresses the 
precise question of agency raised by the Appellants. 
-16-
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After stating that Michael Herzog was told to work with Appellants 
to obtain financing, the Appellants' attorney asked: 
Q. Mike Herzog is your agent then, isn't he? 
A. No. He's not. May I explain something? (R. 493) 
That testimony was uncontradicted and was the only testimony 
in the record addressing the existence of an agency between 
c. Howard Alvey & Sons and Michael Herzog. It should be noted 
further that the Respondents Alvey's instruction to Mr. Herzog 
to assist the Appellants in obtaining financing is not evidence 
of an agency between the Real Estate agent and the respondents 
Alvey, but on the contrary, it is evidence that c. Howard Alvey 
& Sons, preserved the distinction between the building contractor 
and the Real Estate agent, who was responsible to assist the 
buyer in obtaining financing. (R. 476) 
In order for the Appellants to rely upon Rule 63 (9), 
regarding Vicarious Admissions, the Appellants must first show 
that the declarant is unavailable as a witness and second, 
that the statement concerned a matter within the scope of an 
agency or employment of the declarant for the party. Appellants 
concede that no attempt was made to introduce evidence at trial 
to show the unavailability of Michael Herzog. (App. Brief at 
22) Then the Appellants improperly argue alleged facts upon 
which there is no record as justification for not addressing 
availability. [In this connection it should be noted that 
Mr. Herzog was available to provide an affidavit in support 
of Appellants' Motion for New Trial, etc.] 
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The Appellants claim that because they were unable to 
establish an agency between Michael Herzog and c. Howard Alvey 
& Sons, they were relieved of the obligation to address the 
issue of availability of Michael Herzog. No authority is cited 
for this position, on the contrary, Rule 63 (9) provides that 
the exception is only available where the Judge makes a finding 
as to the availability of the witness. Therefore even if the 
court were to assume that an agency had been established beyond 
doubt, the fact remains that the Appellants offered no evidence 
as to the unavailability of the witness as required by Rule 63(9). 
The error Appellants claim resulted from their failure to 
proffer.the testimony for a non-hearsay purpose. The Appellants 
cannot urge, on appeal, a new ground for admissibility. URE 5; 
Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286, 1288 
(Utah 1978); Taliaferro v. Crola, 313 P.2d 136, 138 (Cal. 1957); 
Cochran v. Harrison Memorial Hospital, 254 P.2d 752, 757 (Wash. 
1953) • 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANTS' MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT 
WHERE THE AMENDMENT WAS IMPROPER UNDER 
URCP lS(b) AND WHERE THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ISSUE SOUGHT TO 
BE INTRODUCED BY THE AMENDMENT. 
After the trial, the Appellants attempted to introduce 
the issue of equitable estoppel by way of an amendment to the 
complaint. (R. 173-74) The purpose of the amendment was to 
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attempt to have the Respondents estopped from denying the validity 
of the Earnest Money Agreement. (R. 175, 178) Denial of the 
motion by the trial court was proper on two grounds. 
First, the amendment was not proper under the first sentence 
of URCP lS(b). That sentence provides for amendment of the 
pleadings only where an issue not raised by the pleadings is 
tried by the express or implied consent of the parties. Contrary 
to the Appellants' contention, the issue of estoppel was never 
tried by the implied consent of the parties. 
The Appellants assert that the issue of estoppel was tried 
by implied consent because evidence relevant to an estoppel 
was introduced without objection. (Appellants' Brief at 25) 
This assertion is an incorrect generalization of Rule lS(b) 
and a misunderstanding of the purpose behind Rule lS(b). 
The purpose of Rule lS(b) is to bring the pleadings in 
line with issues actually tried and the rule does not permit 
amendment of the pleadings to include collateral issues which, 
after trial, may find incidental support in the record. Monroe 
v. Futura, Inc., 415 F.2d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1969). 
Where evidence relevant to an issue in the case is also 
submitted as evidence of an issue not embraced by the pleadings, 
the court will not find implied consent to trial of the new 
issue unless, at the time of the submission, counsel indicates 
that the evidence is to go to both the issue in the pleading 
and to the issue outside the pleading. Wright & Miller, 6 
Federal Practice and Procedures §1493 (1971). In Cook v. City 
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of Price, Carbon County, Utah, 566 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1977): 
When evidence claimed to show trial of an 
~ssue by consent pursuant to Rule 15(b), 
is relevant to a separate issue already 
in the case, it would be unjust to the 
opposing party to consider a new theory 
of recovery after trial is complete. This 
rule obtains because an opponent must be 
given a fair chance to plan his defense 
to meet pleaded allegations (Citations 
omitted) 
The Appellants argue that testifying to their conversations 
with the construction foreman and the office secretary without 
objection from the Respondents Alvey, constituted implied consent 
to trial of the issue of estoppel by Respondents Alvey. 
This Court has recognized that when a trial is to the 
bench, rather than to a jury, rulings on the evidence need 
not be scrutinized too critically. Super Tire Market, Inc. 
v. Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417 P. 2d, 132 (1966). Additionally, 
this Court has held that a judgment should not be reversed 
in the absence of error which is substantial and prejudicial 
in the sense that there would be a reasonable liklihood of 
a different result in the absence of such error. URCP 61; 
URE 5; Arnovitz v. Tella, 27 Utah 2d 261, 264, 495 P.2d 310, 
I 312 (1972) . The Appellants claim prejudicial error because 
they were prevented from testifying that Michael Herzog told 
them they need not seek financing until the house was completed. 
The Appellants claim that this is prejudicial in that, regardless 
of the truth of Mr. Herzog's statements, the mere fact that 
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he made the statement would be a substantial factor in determining 
the reasonableness of the Appellants' conduct and would have, 
in all liklihood assured a different decision by the trial 
court. (Appellants' Brief at 24) 
However, this prejudice alleged by the Appellants was 
not a result of the trial court's exclusion of Mr. Herzog's 
statements as hearsay. The testimony was objected to by the 
Respondents and excluded by the trial court only as hearsay. 
No objection was made to the testimony insofar as it was relevant 
to the issue of reasonableness of the Appellants' conduct. 
[It should be noted that the statements of Barney Alvey and 
Pam Tazzer were excluded on the ground of hearsay as to the 
Respondents Micro Investment and Michael Crowley.] (R. 385) 
The statements of Barney Alvey and Pam Tazzer were in 
fact submitted, not as evidence of estoppel, but as evidence 
relevant to the central issue of the case, which was the reason-
ableness of the Appellants' delay in obtaining financing. Nowhere 
is this more clearly demonstrated that in the Appellants' brief 
at pages 11 through 13 wherein the same statements are cited 
as evidence of the reasonableness of the Appellants' conduct. 
The evidence was never prof ferred for the purpose of showing 
estoppel. Therefore, under the established rules governing 
the application of URCP lS(b), the trial court correctly ruled 
that the issue of estoppel had not been tried by the implied 
consent of the parties. 
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The second reason the trial court correctly denied Appellants' 
Motion to Amend the Complaint was because the element of equitable 
estoppel had not been established by the Appellants. As noted 
by the Appellants, equitable estoppel arises when (1) a party 
by its actions or representations, induces the other party 
to believe certain facts to exist, (2) that such other party, 
acting with reasonable prudence and diligence, relies upon 
the acts or representations, and (3) that the party relying 
on the representation or acts will suffer injustice if the 
other party is permitted to deny such facts. (Appellants' 
Brief at 26). 
The Appellants allege that the Respondents should not 
be permitted to deny the validity of the Earnest Money Agreement 
because of the representations made by Barney Alvey and Pam 
Tazzer regarding the construction of the home. However, the 
Appellants admitted that they had never been instructed by 
the Respondents Alvey, to deal with either Pam Tazzer or Barney 
Alvey regarding construction of the home. (R. 415, 448) The 
Appellants were aware that the Earnest Money Agreement was 
not fully binding until they had obtained financing. (R. 375, 
406) The Appellants never directly communicated with either 
of the general partners of C. Howard Alvey & Sons regarding 
any aspect of either the construction of the home or the validity 
of the Earnest Money Agreement. (R. 404, 415) Finally, it 
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was not until months after the suit was conunenced that Appellants 
obtained financing. (R. 345, 346, 389) 
These facts confirm that, notwithstanding the imputation 
of the representations of Barney Alvey and Pam Tazzer to the 
Respondents Alvey, the Appellants failed to act with reasonable 
prudence and diligence as to their obligations under the Earnest 
Money Agreement. As the trial court noted in Finding of Fact 
No. 11, the Respondents Alvey did nothing to prevent, hinder 
or otherwise impair the Appellants from obtaining financing 
within a reasonable time as required under the terms of the 
Earnest Money Agreement. (R. 227) 
Finally, the Appellants cannot show that they suffered 
injustice by the Respondents' denial of the validity of the 
Earnest Money Agreement. As the trial court recognized, the 
central issue upon which the outcome of the case rested, was 
whether or not the Appellants took steps to obtain financing 
within a reasonable time. (R. 503-04) Based upon the substantial 
evidence submitted at trial, the lower court concluded that 
the Appellants failed to use reasonable diligence as required 
by law and therefore would suffer no injustice by the Respondents' 
denial of the validity of the contract. Hawaiian Ocean View 
Estates v. Yates, 564 P.2d 436, 442 (Hawaii 1977); Newton v. 
Hornblower, Inc., 582 P.2d 1136, 1144 (Kansas 1978); Citing 
28 Am Jur 2d, Estoppel and Waiver §78-80 (1966). 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court record reflects substantial evidence upon 
which the trial judge based his ruling that the Appellants' 
failed to pursue financing for the home with reasonable diligence 
I 
as was required of them by law. 
Exclusion of the testimony of Michael Herzog was proper 
in view of the fact that the Appellants failed to establish 
admissibility under an exception to the hearsay rule and never 
proffered the testimony for a non-hearsay purpose. 
Finally, denial of the Appellants' Motion to Amend the 
Complaint after trial was proper in view of the fact that the 
issue of estoppel sought to be introduced by amendment was 
not tried by the implied consent of the parties nor had the 
Appellants established that they attempted to perform their 
obligations under the contract with reasonable diligence. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 12th day of May, 1980 
R~ALD L.-POULTON 
Attorney for Defendants-
Respondents Michael E. Crowley 
and Micro Investments 
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